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Foreword 
As guest editors  of this Special Issue of PE/JEP we have selected a small number of rather 
detailed assessment of  contemporary history of domestic industrial policies in the international  
context. The four papers included in this Special Issue can be seen as three case studies of 
“sectoral” innovation policies (broad band, wind energy, biotechnology) with a strong  emphasis 
on country institutional features and policy instruments, together with one “horizontal” case of 
industrial policy in a specific country context (innovative startups in Italy). 
The heterogeneous theoretical background (industrial organization, evolutionary theory of the 
firm, economics of innovation, development) provides a somewhat unifying hidden thread of 
these case studies, without becoming a subject of analysis per se. This approach has been our 
intentional editorial choice and we are fully aware of its limitations. 
After very short non-technical summaries of the four papers  (Section 1) we try to present a 
rather synthetic assessment of our personal  views (largely shared among us even with partial 
minor disagreements) about the increasingly hot debate on the nature, limitations and desirable 
perspectives of industrial policy today. We argue for a non-ideological forward-looking role of 
governments as active players in helping domestic entrepreneurial resources not only  to fully 
exploit inherited comparative advantages but also to face structural uncertainties and discover 
own potential competitive advantages in a rapidly changing international context (Section 2). 
  
1. Non-technical summaries of the four papers 
 
The paper “Fiber to the people: the development of the Ultra-broadband network in Italy”, by 
Michele Polo, Carlo Cambini and Antonio Sassano, after a brief overview of the fiber-optic 
technological solutions aimed at providing high-speed broadband services to consumers (“next 
generation network”), covers some empirical evidence on the role of regulations in 
infrastructure-based competition. Then it dwells on supply and demand for broadband access in 
Italy compared to the European Digital Agenda, finally coming to an evaluation of the Italian 
government  Master Plan approved in March 2015. The Plan assigns almost 95.000 cells  (mini-
territorial areas) to different Clusters according to different existing and foreseeable private 
infrastructure and related need for public support, in order to reach targets of fast and ultra-fast 
access for different percentages of the residential population. Given the high degree of 
heterogeneity in terms of infrastructural endowment and degree of competition among existing 
private and public players, the optimum allocation of public subsidies coherent with rules of 
state aid discipline appears extremely complex. The paper provides an eloquent example of how 
difficult is to find  the appropriate combination of private incentives and non distortionary 
public tools in a market-oriented perspective, in a sector characterized by fast technological 
development, entry barriers and spatial spillovers. 
 
In his paper “The role of industrial policies in the development of a competitive wind energy 
industry: the Danish and Chinese sectoral innovation systems” Enrico Botta provides evidence 
about convergence of environmental (green growth) and industrial policy targets in the special 
case of an innovative sector (wind turbines), comparing two rather different  country “sectoral 
systems of innovation”. Denmark has enjoyed the first mover advantage of advanced wind 
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industry since 1979, going through the classical industry life cycle (infancy, early adopters, 
selection of dominant design and subsequent industry concentration, gradual shift from product  
to process innovation). Such an evolution along the industry-technology cycle has been fostered 
by a full range of industrial policy tools (demand  and  supply):  from strong incentives to 
individual users and cooperatives to feed-in tariffs and price-setting mechanisms establishing a 
link to other electrical generation  sources, publicly supported R&D through a National 
Laboratory for Sustainable Energy, strict grid connection regulations. 
The Chinese sectoral innovation system for wind turbines has been based on a mix of demand-
pull and technology-push (including knowledge generation) instruments: strong tariff  incentives 
to domestic demand; investment incentives  leading to overcapacity; licensing  technologies 
from foreign sources soon evolving into multiplication of domestic R&D centres;  increasing 
patenting activity ending in SOEs’ acquisition of foreign licensors;  national testing laboratories; 
generous concessional loans by China Development Bank to emerging markets wind farms 
favouring the Chinese foreign  expansion. 
 
Luigi Orsenigo’s paper “Industrial policies in Europe and other advanced countries: 
biotechnology” starts with a quick historical overview of American early start (Genentech 1976) 
and subsequent developments of an outstanding science-based technological industry, in which 
public R&D funding and availability of venture capital financing have jointly supported an overall 
growth of knowledge-intensive geographical clusters of science and industrial platforms. 
Genetic engineering and molecular biology quickly formed the knowledge base for production 
of large as well as small molecules with multiple technological trajectories, ranging from 
pharmaceucals to agrobusiness to industrial applications. In the US the three pillars of the so-
called Silicon Valley Consensus (commercialization of scientific research, strong IPR regime, 
venture capital and private equity) have been reinforced by the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) which 
greatly encouraged university patenting and licensing. According to Orsenigo, the Silicon valley 
consensus was itself the outcome of rather clear policy decisions: so that biotechnology (as we 
know it) is largely the offspring of an explicit industrial policy. 
Europe has been unable to generate a revised version of the Silicon Valley Consensus, mainly 
due to less massive and concentrated public funding of large scale-high quality research base 
(excessive national fragmentation despite EU-funded programs), sluggish spread of venture 
capital with long-term profitability perspectives, smaller average size of biotech firms, greater 
obstacles to intra-European skilled labour mobility, more cumbersome regulatory processes, 
weaker entrepreneurial propensity by traditional academic researchers. At the same time the 
role of a strong IPR regime is increasingly under scrutiny both in Europe and the US, to the 
extent that strategic use of patents may discourage new areas of research by potential 
competitors, whereas norms and rules of “open science” foster new possibilities of major 
technological advances in biomedical research.  
 
Drawing data from a special register introduced in 2012 by an Italian law, the paper “The special 
features of innovative start-ups in Italy” by Bank of Italy’s researchers Stefania De Mitri-Paolo 
Finaldi Russo-Silvia Magri and Cristina Rampazzi perform an exercise of propensity score 
matching between 1700 innovative start-ups (ISUPs) in 2013 and a control sample of other 
startups drawn from Cerved database of about 100.000 firms . Innovative startups are defined 
according to different features such as age, size and propensity to R&D expenditures.  
ISUPs are characterized by smaller size in terms of total assets and turnover but higher 
propensity  to invest,  higher incidence of intangible assets (patents, brands), higher liquidity 
ratios, higher level of capitalization (especially those that have received more financial support 
by business angels and venture capital), lower debt/assets ratios, lower share of non-financial 
(trade) debt, lower share of bank loans and short-term debt. Lack of time series on these data 
prevent a dynamic analysis of performance and of structural characteristics.  
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2. Redesigning modern industrial policies in Europe 
 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession European economies remain stuck. Growth is 
expected by the IMF to be just 1.8% across the European Union in 2016, and only 1.5% in 
the Euro Area.1 In addition to the weakness of demand, is the weakness of business 
investment, which remains well below its 2008 trajectory.2 And given that the objective is 
not just growth, but growth that is smarter, more inclusive and more sustainable3—falling 
levels of innovation, rising level of inequality, and green policies that remain weak, 
unequally distributed, and non-systematic are surely not good news for the future of 
Europe’s Horizon 2020 agenda.  
 
The problem is a lack of both public and private investment. EU governments are, in the name 
of needed ‘austerity’ to ‘balance the books’, pursuing pro-cyclical spending policies, while 
companies continue to cut back, hoarding cash on their balance sheets or returning it to 
shareholders through dividends or buy-backs4. Both hoarding and share buybacks are at record 
levels.  
 
The problem is a lack of expectations on future opportunities: animal spirits. This is a key insight 
of Keynes.5 The motivation for firms to enter new markets or make investments in existing ones 
is driven by expectations of future gains.6 But why are those opportunities not there? When 
both the public and private sectors are not investing (one due to austerity, and the other due to 
perverse effects of financial liberalization)—we might get secular stagnation. This is not due to 
exogenous factors, but endogenous to the (lack of) investment.  
 
So the big question is: how can the desire to invest (animal spirits) be induced via policy?  The 
conventional policy approach, advocated by the IMF and others, is either through incentives (via 
different types of tax cuts or lightening regulation7, or through basic spending on public 
infrastructure to address market failures in the provision of public goods which can crowd in 
private investments. While infrastructure spending is welcome (and a good idea when interest 
rates are so low: according to the IMF, they can also produce positive impacts on public 
finances, due to their effects – due to large multipliers – on gdp) 8, its impact on industrial 
transformation  it is almost zero. The alternative to austerity must be more than tax incentives, 
better administrative regulations, building bridges and roads and so on. What businesses are 
lacking is a sense of where the future opportunities will lie. Through some sort of mission-
oriented policy far-sighted states can do much more to provide the direction that is needed to 
unlock investment. Indeed, it is these types of investments that got us the IT revolution, the 
biotech revolution, the nanotech revolution and today are bringing us the greentech revolution 
(too slow)9.  
 
                                                        
1 International Monetary Fund. 2016. World Economic Outlook: Too Slow for Too Long. Washington, April 
2 International Monetary Fund. 2015. World Economic Outlook: Uneven Growth—Short- and Long-Term Factors. Washington (April), 
p113 
3 EC Horizon 2020 strategy http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/europe_2020_explained.pdf (accessed 20/5/2016) 
4  Lazonick, W. (2014). Profits without prosperity. Harvard Business Review, 92(9), 46-55. 
5 Keynes, J.M., 1936. The general theory of employment, interest and money. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.  
6 Dosi, G. and Lovallo, D., 2007. ‘Rational entrepreneurs or optimistic martyrs? Some considerations on technological regimes, 
corporate entries, and the evolutionary role of decision biases’, in Garud et al., eds. Technological Innovation: Oversights and 
Foresights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–68.  
7 IMF, Fiscal policies for innovation and growth, in  Fiscal Monitor, April 2016  
8 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2014  
9 Mazzucato, M., 2013. The entrepreneurial state: Debunking the public vs. private myth in risk and innovation. London: Anthem 
Press.  
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Market failure theory assigns only a limited role to the state – to ‘fix’ markets.  Through the 
influence of mainstream public choice theory, it focuses on the risks of state action rather than 
potential role of market guidance. This approach can lead to incremental change. But while 
innovation has a rate, it also has a direction – and the blind direction chosen by the market’s 
(more or less) invisible hand is may well often be sub-optimal. It is not the way that major 
breakthroughs happened in the past, and it is not the way we are likely to address the major 
challenges of the future.  Examples from history show what is possible when governments act in 
visionary ways to design new futures, solve public problems and spur the creation of new 
markets in a business environment fraught with uncertainty. This is based on a very different 
understanding of the role of the state and of the relationship between the state and market 
actors in the wealth creating process.  
 
From defense-related early computer development to Apollo missions that put a man on the 
moon, to huge investments that lay behind the creation of the Internet and entire new sectors 
like biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the emerging green technology revolution, 
government agencies have done much more than simply address market failures or only ‘de-
risk’ an innovative private sector. In the US, but gradually in other countries such as Japan-
Israel-Taiwan-Singapore-South Korea,  they acted boldly, taking risks, to create a future 
environment that market actors could not have created alone. Public organisations in the 
United States from NASA to DARPA to the National Institutes of Health invested along the entire 
innovation chain, courageously defining new high-risk directions. Traditional cost-benefit 
analysis and market failure justifications used by conventional economic theory would very 
likely have halted these investments from the very start. Furthermore, all these 
transformational changes required active investments on both the supply and demand side.10   
 
Indeed, innovation policy can learn a lot from these stories. Consequently there has been a call 
in recent years for a return to mission-oriented policies as a way to address grand societal 
challenges11. In the past, missions were often related to a well-defined outcome, such as putting 
a man on the moon, which entailed mostly technological challenges. Some researchers have 
claimed that modern missions are more complex because there are fewer clear technological 
challenges and outcomes are less clearly defined12. Contemporary missions aim to address 
broader challenges that require long-term commitment to the development of many 
technological solutions and “a continuing high rate of technical change and a set of institutional 
changes”13. One could add that these challenges also require changes at the societal/national 
systems level.  
 
The role of an active industrial policy can be clearly seen in all three case studies presented in 
this Special Issue (broad band, wind energy, biotech).  
 
However, there is a clear difference between the American and the European situation. in the 
former case, research and industrial policies are performed at the federal level by the Federal 
Government (with state government playing a complementary role with reference to “local” 
industrial policies). In Europe there is a complex multilevel governance.  
                                                        
10 Mazzucato  M. (2016) "From Market Fixing to Market-Creating: A new framework for innovation policy",  Special Issue of Industry 
and Innovation: “Innovation Policy – can it make a difference?” Vol. 23(2).    
11
 Mowery, D. C., Nelson, R. R. and Martin, B. R. (2010) ‘Technology policy and global warming: 
Why new policy models are needed (or why putting new wine in old bottles won’t work)’, Research 
Policy, 39(8), pp. 1011-1023 
12 Foray, D., Mowery, D. and Nelson, R. R. (2012) ‘Public R&D and social challenges: What lessons from mission R&D programs?’, 
Research Policy, 41(10), pp. 1697-1902. 
13 Freeman, C. (1996) ‘The Greening of technology and models of innovation’, Technological Forecasting & Social Change, 53(1), pp. 
27-39. p. 34 
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At the European level, the EU budget, via the Horizon 2020 programme (corresponding, for the 
2014-20 to the previous “Framework Programmes”) promotes and finances some co-operative 
research and innovation projects. however, the size of the Horizon 2020  is limited (around 70 
billion euros for the 7 years), not comparable with the financing of R&I in the United States (as 
well as in China or Japan). Morevoer, the EU Commission has a notable influence on the 
European industrial structure due to the state aid regulation and decisions. One has to keep in 
mind that state aid regulations were designed, and are implemented, with the goal of 
promoting market competition and access, with no consideration of the role that can be played 
by European firms in the international scenario. 
 
At the national level, all European countries  perform national industrial policies14. Their goals 
and instruments are markedly different, but they all share, even in the German case, a size of 
the “national innovation system” that is much smaller than the American, the Chinese and the 
Japanese ones. Finally, one should also add the role of regional authorities: in some case, 
notably germany and italy, their role if far from neglegible. The UE Commission itself promotes 
the role of regional government (e.g. in designing and implementing smart specialization 
strategies). 
 
So, in a nutshell, what we can learn from the American economic history cannot be transported 
as such – as a policy implication – to Europe, given the completely different institutional 
settings. Orsenigo’s paper discusses some of these issues concerning the US-EU comparison in 
the biotech case. 
 
As it is  well known, this calls for pan-European R&I initiatives, to reach scale and scope 
comparable to international competititors. EU initiatives, to be financed by a larger EU budget 
and managed by EU authorities, that appear to be hardly conceivable in the present, confused, 
European political scenario. 
 
However, this is not at all to say that national technological and industrial policies cannot be 
successfully performed, in Europe, at the national level. Enrico Botta’s paper provides a useful 
analysis concerning a case in which a small European country (Denmark) successfully managed 
to become a technological leader in the field of wind energy. The German experience provides 
both very interesting histories of technological/industrial policies and a strong commitment (the 
industry 4.0 plan) for the future. 
 
A plausible mission oriented industrial policy is no longer today about financing a limited set of 
particular sectors (vertical policies), often subject to risks of “government failure” due to 
capture by private special interests and/or disguised political rent-seeking power. The bad 
Italian experience with degenerate State-owned system in steel and chemical sectors after the 
glorious early postwar period is a case in point.15 Neither a modern industrial policy must be 
restricted to occasional response to specific firm crisis situations hitting specific territories and 
                                                        
14 Naudè W. (2010) Industrial Policy: Old and New Issues, Working Paper 2010/106, United Nations University; OECD Development 
Centre (2013), Perspectives on Global Development 2013. Industrial Policies in a Changing World. Shifting up a Gear, OECD, Parigi; 
Wade R.H. (2012), Return of Industrial Policy?, International Review of Applied Economics, 26(2); Warwick K. (2013), Beyond 
Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New Trends, OECD Science, Technology and Industrial Policy Papers, n. 2;  Onida F.,  Viesti G. 
(a cura di) (2016) Una nuova politica industriale in Italia. Investimenti, innovazione, trasferimento tecnologico, Passigli, Firenze 
 
15 An analysis of successes and failures of national industrial policies in Europe is in Owen G. (2012) Industrial policy in Europe since 
the Second World War: what has been learnt?, ECIPE Occasional Paper 1, The European Centre for International Political Economy,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Bruxelles. 
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challenging the available resources of the welfare State.  Nor these policies can only focus on 
horizontal framework policies. 
It’s more about coming up with large (mission oriented) public programs of pre-competitive 
R&D cutting through different sectors, using general purpose technologies to foster productivity 
increases across the economy, and setting up collaborations among individual firms and 
between the public and private sector in new ways. Fundamentally it requires patient finance 
from the public sector to invest in long run, high risk capital intensive areas—where risk averse 
firms are too fearful to tread. Only such a patient financing may support the entrepreneurial 
“self-discovery” of own potential comparative advantages in directions that the private sector is 
unwilling to explore, due to basic outcome uncertainty and too long time horizons for 
reasonable profitability. There is ample room for information externalities and related public-
private “strategic coordination” in presence of scale economies. Essential conditions for this 
type of virtuous role of the State as catalyser of innovation are a strict surveillance on risks of 
corruption and rent-seeking, as well as the ability to “pick the loser” whenever a given program 
reveals itself unable to deliver the expected results in due time. As Dani Rodrik puts it “the right 
way of thinking of industrial policy is a discovery process – one where firms and the government 
learn about underlying costs and opportunities and engage in strategic coordination (…) It is the 
information externalities generated by ignorance in the private sector that creates a useful 
public role” 16  
 
There is an increasing awareness among institutions such as OECD and the European 
Commission17, as well among some private business observatories,18 that a return to decent 
rate  of growth of total factor productivity in Europe and elsewhere must target greater 
interconnectivity among firms as well as between firms (large, medium, small) and public 
research institutions. The same holds for a greater degree of international integration.19 
Even the liberal-oriented Monti report for Barroso in its chapter “Why state aid and control 
matters” comes to say “There is also a consensus that an EU action should have some vertical 
elements, helping national policies to focus on selected highly promising sectors, such as 
energy, innovative industries and clean vehicles, without forgetting the needs of manufacturing 
industries. The EU should move ahead to formulate its new conception of an active industrial 
policy to complement the relaunch of the single market”20 
Historically, when the public sector leads as a bold, market-creating risk-taker, private sector 
investment follows. In his desire to get innovation going for green as it did for IT, Bill Gates 
recently said: government must lead, only then will the private sector follow (I’LL ADD TWO 
                                                        
16 Rodrik, D., Industrial policy for the twenty-first century, in Rodrik D., (2007), One economics, many recipes: globalization, 
institutions, and economic growth, Princeton University Press, ch. 4. It draws heavily from the seminal paper by HausmannR. 
And Rodrik D., (2003) Economic development as self-discovery, Journal of Development Economics, 72: 603-33. See also 
Aghion P.,Boulanger E. and Cohen S. (2011), Rethinking industrial policy, Bruegel Policy Briefs, June.  
17 Warwick K. (2013), Beyond industrial policy. Merging issues and new trends, OECD Science Technology and Industry 
Policy Papers, 2; Craft N. and Hughes A., (2013)Industrial policy for the medium to long-term, CBR Working Paper, n. 455; 
Stiglitz J.E. and J. Lin Y. eds. (2013), The industrial policy revolutionI. The role of government beyond ideology, New York, 
Palgrave MacMillan,;  Dutz M.A., Kuznetsov Y., Lasagabaster E. and Piklat D,, eds., (2014)Making innovation policy work. 
Learning from experimentation, OECD-World Bank (2014); EC Commission, For a European  industrial Renaissance, COM 
(2014), 14 Final; EC Commission (2014), A vision for the internal market for industrial products (and related Staff Working 
Documents); European Parliament (2015), EU industrial policy. Assessment of recent developments and recommendations 
for future policies. Study for the ITRE Committee. 
18 Confindustria Centro Studi, Scenari industriali,  giugno 2014: “Si tratta di interventi di politica industriale per loro stessa 
natura selettivi, vista la scarsità delle risorse a disposizione dello Stato, dove però la selettività non ha come obiettivo singoli 
sub-settori dell’economia o singole imprese (i cosiddetti campioni nazionali), ma riguarda innanzi tutto le traiettorie di 
cambiamento, sia nei bisogni dei consumatori sia nelle tecnologie disponibili, che si intende intercettare orientando lo 
sviluppo del sistema produttivo e identificando a cascata le filiere produttive interessate,le loro potenziali interconnessioni e 
i problemi tecnici, organizzativi e normativi che ostacolano la creazione e la diffusione di nuove idee e prodotti”. 
19 OECD (2013), , Interconnected economies. Benefiting from global value chains; McKinsey Global Institute (2012), 
Manufacturing the future: the next era of global growth and innovation, November. 
20 A new strategy for the Single Market at the service of Europe’s economy and society, Bruxelles, 9 May 2010. 
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REFS LATER.) And just as direction provided by mission-oriented policy characterises the 
innovation process, so the deployment of innovation requires clear direction if it is to unlock 
investment. Given the right encouragement, the ‘green’ direction can provide the impetus for 
investment in the full deployment of ICT.21  
 
The challenge for states then becomes: 
 To create sufficiently credible, stable and enduring commitments in a given direction to channel 
investment, and provide any necessary complementary assets needed for private sector 
investment – laying down the tramlines for the deployment of new ideas.  
 To ensure the availability of patient committed finance through public funding, such as state 
investment banks or public venture capital funds, but also from stimulating sources of patient 
private sector finance; and 
 To set rules of the game which encourage close responsible interactions between economic 
actors, reward firms which take a longer-term offering a broader perspective on the value they 
create, and supplying  a fair balance of risk and reward to different actors. 
 
The horizontal dimension of an active industrial policy must not overlook two fundamental 
ingredients that specifically apply to the European context of highly fragmented institutions and 
territories. 
 First, special care must be given to the design and implementation of suitable channels for transfer 
of scientific and technological knowledge (Universities, public research centres)  to business  firms’ 
innovative activity. Much of the “European paradox” (lot of scientific excellence not enough 
reflected in business leadership and industrial competitiveness) has to do with the relative 
weakness of  government-backed institutions equipped for supplying fluent pervasive mechanisms 
of “technology transfer” to medium and low size firms. The German tradition of complementary 
action by Max Planck institutes and Fraunhofer societies are a good benchmark in this respect. 
Similar examples may be found in the Dutch TNO and the newly designed British “Catapult 
Cenrtres”.     
Second, the more or less rich battery of public horizontal fiscal and financial incentives to business 
investment  and employment should aim at encouraging networks of interconnected firms, each of 
them often well endowed with human capital, but too small in size for achieving a critical mass in 
global competition. Again, governments can draw some lessons from more or less successful 
experiences of “Technology clusters” which manage to attract innovative firms of different size, as 
well as institutions and individual talents. As it is well known, even in a digital age geographical 
proximity keeps playing a crucial role in fostering spillovers of ideas, knowledge and managerial 
skills.22 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
21 Perez, C. ‘Capitalism, Technology and a Green Global Golden Age: the role of history in helping shape the future’, in Mazzucato, 
M. and Jacobs, M., eds. Rethinking Capitalism (forthcoming); and …… 
Mazzucato, M. and Perez, C. (2015), “Innovation as Growth Policy,” in The Triple Challenge:  Europe in a New Age.  Fagerberg J.,  
Laestadius S., and  Martin B. (eds.) Oxford University Press: Oxford 
 
22 Patel P. (1995), The localized production of global technology, in “Cambridge Journal of Economics”, 19 (I), 141-53; 
Moretti E. (2012), New geography of jobs, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
